The Turkish and Turkish Cypriot Muslim Community in England

Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities
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Change Institute
April 2009
Communities and Local Government: London
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1 Executive Summary

1.1 Introduction and context

This report is one of thirteen reports on England’s Muslim ethnic communities commissioned by the Cohesion Directorate of Communities and Local Government (CLG) in order to understand the diversity of England’s Muslim population and to help enhance its engagement and partnership with Muslim civil society.

The primary goal of the research was to detail the main population and community locations, identify denominations and religious practices, and identify the strengths of links with the country of origin. An overarching objective for the project was to identify how government could best engage and work in partnership with specific communities.

For many of these communities, there was little pre-existing research specific to the community. Hence the research was expanded to include other areas such as identity, language use, socio economic situations, and intra-community dynamics. Since the country and migration contexts are important, these have also been briefly detailed.

The relatively limited scope of this study in relation to individual communities means that there is still a great deal more research needed in order to establish comprehensive knowledge and understanding about the different communities. This study provides first insights into the communities rather than offering firm conclusions, and hence should be understood as a starting point rather than an endpoint in getting to know the different communities covered by the research.

This report details the research findings for the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot Muslim community. There are three main groups constituting the Turkish community in Britain, namely Turkish Cypriots, Kurds and mainland Turks. This report primarily focuses on the Turkish Cypriot and mainland Turkish communities.1 The report includes references to Kurds from Turkey but a separate report on the Kurdish community in England is recommended. Individual reports for the other twelve communities covered by the study as well as a separate report synthesising the overall research findings are available from Communities and Local Government.

This report focuses on the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot community in England and as such those interviewed and involved in focus groups were based in England. However, some of the existing research and data on the community refers to England; England and Wales; Great Britain; and the United Kingdom. Thus the report refers to whichever of these is the most relevant in the context.

1 This report uses the term ‘Turkish Speaking Community’ to refer to all three communities. Specific references are made to the distinct ethnic communities where necessary.
1.2 Migration and England’s Turkish Speaking Muslim population

Despite the absence of colonial links, the Turkish are one of the largest migrant populations in Western Europe, including two million in Germany and around 300,000 in the Netherlands. The population in Britain is unique by comparison with the Turkish communities in Western Europe because of the large Turkish Cypriot population. Each of the Turkish groups in the UK has a separate migration history, alongside different experiences of integration. Turkish Cypriots formed the first of the UK Turkish communities and their presence is an important feature of the British story as they have not settled in such numbers in any other European country. Turkish Cypriots first migrated to Britain in significant numbers between 1945 and 1955. Turkish migration from mainland Turkey to the UK did not start until the late 1960s and was largely a consequence of limited employment opportunities in Turkey. Ethnic Kurds began to enter in larger numbers during the late 1980s and early 1990s, often with refugee and asylum seeker status, and at a time when the economic circumstances in the UK were far less favourable.

It is estimated that there are 80,000 Turkish people living in Britain, of whom 60,000 live in London. In addition, there are estimated to be 130,000 Turkish Cypriots in the UK. It is unlikely that any of the official figures available provide a true indication of the size of the Turkish speaking population in the country as much of the official data is only available by country of birth and excludes British born and dual heritage children.

As with many of the other communities in this study, the vast majority of the Turkish community is based in greater London. Outside of London there are smaller communities in Birmingham, Hertfordshire, Luton, Manchester, Sheffield and the East Midlands. The first Turkish Cypriot arrivals in London settled mainly in the Euston and Camden areas, later moving to Seven Sisters, Haringey, Palmers Green and Enfield. Kurdish people are reported to have settled down mainly in Haringey and Hackney. The Turkish speaking populations are resident in other parts of London including Lewisham, Lambeth, Southwark, Croydon, Islington, Kensington, Waltham Forest, and Wood Green.

1.3 Socio economic status

Employment in the Turkish community was dominated by the textile industries in the 1970s and the demise of these had a profound effect on the economic status of the community, leading to mass unemployment among the Turkish speaking community. However, since then the situation of the community has improved considerably and the Turkish socio economic presence is now felt across London and England. However, there are notable differences between the socio economic situations of the Kurdish, Turkish and Cypriot communities. Turkish Cypriots are generally perceived by respondents as more advantaged and more likely to be in professional occupations as they have been here for a longer period. Kurds, as the newest migrant group, are reported to suffer the highest levels of disadvantage within the Turkish speaking community, in part linked to their refugee status, although this perception is challenged by some.
1.4 Identity, religion and language

Existing literature that explores identity among the Turkish speaking communities in England highlights the interplay between religion, ethnicity and culture in the formation of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot identity. Many in the Turkish community continue to maintain a strong Turkish identity and affiliation to their Turkish culture, although there are a smaller group of ‘non-religious’ or secular Turkish people who are less interested in preserving Turkish cultural values and practices. Young Turks born and brought up in the UK on the other hand are negotiating their identity in the context of the various cultures they are confronted within contemporary British society. The younger generation have more of a hybrid Turkish and British identity, with an emphasis on the cultural identity transferred from their parents.

Turkish ethnicity also impacts strongly on identity formation. Each of the three main groups is seen as having a distinctive background and set of issues/problems and needs. Since some of these differences are due to their cultural, social and historical backgrounds in Turkey and Cyprus, and these differences can emerge during their interactions with each other. The distinct identities of these groups are increasingly being recognised by local authorities, some of which have started to break down local ethnic monitoring categories into Turkish Cypriot, Turkish and Kurdish, alongside the White Other category which was commonly used for self identification by many Turkish people.

According to the 2001 Census, 75 per cent of England’s Turkey-born population are Muslim, and 24 per cent of migrants born in Cyprus are Muslim. In the UK, the majority of the Turkish speaking community belong to the Sunni sect of Islam, mainly adhering to Hanafi School of thought. Sunni Kurds, who are originally from Northern Iraq and Eastern Turkey, tend to follow the Shafi School of thought. There are also small communities of Alevi, Ismaili and Jafaris among the Turkish community in the UK. These schools can be broken down further into various denominations and currents followed by religious practitioners in the community.

Turkish is the main language spoken among the communities in the UK, but Kurdish and a Turkish Cypriot dialect are also spoken among those groups. In addition, there are many other dialects and accents in the Turkish language as a result of history and cross cultural relationships. The first generation and recent migrants often speak fluent Turkish only and women within the community are particularly constrained by language limitations. Young people from a very young age commonly attend Turkish school at the weekend and after school to learn about Turkish culture including dances, food, history and the language. A new Turkish language, ‘Anglo-Turkish’, has been forming amongst the second and third generations, where English and Turkish is used interchangeably, in the same sentences and in grammatically imaginative ways.
1.5 Intergenerational dynamics, young people and the role of women in the community

Interaction between generations has become increasingly weak and fractured, characterised by confrontations over lifestyle choices, Turkish values and identity. Young people face both peer and parental pressure to conform to seemingly competing cultural identities and find it difficult to negotiate between the culture of their country of heritage and the wider culture they live in. Parents and older generations fear that they may lose their young people to wider society and many feel unable to provide the guidance and support young people need. As a consequence of this, many young people are seen to be very troubled and turning to their peers for support, often in the form of gangs and involvement in drugs and criminality. An additional concern expressed by some was the rising levels of suicides that have been occurring among Turkish youth over the past few years.

The educational underachievement of young people, particularly that of young males, is a key concern and many parents who lack English language skills and a familiarity with the British school system feel helpless about offering the adequate support children need to do better in education. Some parents, however, consciously discourage children to pursue post school studies, preferring them to take up the running of family businesses instead.

Women in the Turkish community have traditionally played a nurturing role in the family as well as being active in work and in the community, but many feel physically and emotionally unsupported by men in carrying out this role. Most Turkish speaking women of the first generation with little formal education or English language skills had limited employment prospects, and many tended to be involved in their husband’s businesses. English language ability is reported to be a continuing problem for many women in the community, compounding many of the issues that they face with regards to domestic violence, intergenerational problems, and access to the labour market and public services. However, this situation is perceived to be slowly changing as more young women are going into higher education and moving into professional jobs such as teaching.

1.6 Other issues affecting the community

Low levels of educational attainment by young people are seen as the most pressing issue for the community. Housing is also seen as an important issue and many families are thought to be suffering from overcrowding.

1.7 Cohesion and integration

Most people do not view the Turkish community as ‘settled’ or sufficiently integrated in the UK yet for reasons of perceived inequalities, a felt lack of services provided to them, and their ‘invisibility’ in mainstream society and institutions. Many also face the
dilemma of seeing themselves as Europeans, but not being accepted as such by other Europeans. Equally, many perceive themselves as the target of the increase in general anti-Muslim hostility post 9/11 and 7/7.

Alongside such external barriers to integration, strong identity formation and identification with Turkish culture and country of origin is also accepted as having had an impact on cohesion and integration, particularly among the older generation as they strive to sustain their Turkish identity. Whilst many acknowledge that more effort is needed on the part of the Turkish community to integrate, they also feel that the integration debate and effort is very one sided, and that more needs to be done by mainstream society to foster cohesion and integration in ways that the community has begun through its Dialogue Society initiative – see section 12.

1.8 Media and links with country of origin

Most people in the Turkish speaking community view the British media, particularly the tabloid press, as being prejudiced against Turks and Turkey, and against Muslim people in general. They suggest that such reporting makes all Muslim communities feel alienated and distant from the mainstream society and as a result of mistrust of the British media and its focus on mainstream British culture, many in the community turn to the Turkish media for news and entertainment. This in turn is seen as having negative consequences for integration and cohesion.

The Turkish-speaking community is well provided for in London, with half a dozen local community-based newspapers, together with Turkish television channels and countless digital radio channels. Most papers can also be accessed online, though there is a generational gap in terms of access and usage of the internet and in the content of what is accessed. The unresolved political situation in Cyprus has resulted in substantial coverage of the issue on the net with websites dedicated to highlighting the plight of Turkish Cypriots, with a slant on human rights abuses of the past and existing embargoes.

People travel to Turkey regularly to visit family and friends, often staying for extended periods of two-three months. Some however face travel difficulties if they do not have indefinite leave to remain in the UK. This is more of an issue for later migrants rather than those who came here in the 1970s or earlier. In common with many other migrant communities, early Turkish migrants were preoccupied with the idea of return. However, this desire to return to country of birth has changed as families become more established and older generations become less inclined to leave their UK-born children and grandchildren behind. Remittances are a common community practice. In addition, the majority of first generation migrants have invested, and are still investing, in both Turkey and Cyprus, particularly in properties which can be used not only for holiday homes, but for business reasons as well.
1.9 Civil society and civic engagement

Cultural, religious and religious-political organisations play an important role in the construction and maintenance of Turkish identity in Britain. The majority of the Turkish religious centres tend to be used by mainland Turks as Turkish Cypriots are more ‘culturally’ religious. Within Cypriot organisations it is common to find that provision that is open to many non-Turkish ethnic groups. Kurds tend to use Kurdish centres that cater for Kurds from a number of countries including Turkey. Civil society organisations provide a wide range of services including supplementary schools, women’s groups, advice centres, organisations specialising in job training, and informal groups which allow people to come together to discuss common problems and what is happening in the community.

The main community influences are seen to be institutions and community organisations rather than individual figures. They range from Turkish supplementary schools to well established mosques in London such as Azizia and Suleymaniye. One of the main groups identified as being influential is the Nur Cemati which follows the teachings of the theologian Fethullah Gülen, and which draw on a school of thought based on the 19th and 20th Islamic figure Said Nursi. Political influencers in the Turkish speaking community include political figures and parties in Cyprus such as the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), who want a unified Cyprus, and president Rauf Denktash of Northern Cyprus.

The prevailing view amongst respondents is that whilst few organisations have established good relations with public authorities, there is a general lack of engagement between public authorities and the Turkish speaking community, despite the period of time the communities have been settled here. A common perception is that engagement only occurs during election periods, when political party representatives contact Turkish community organisations in order to gain votes. Despite some of the problems and barriers to engagement that exist internally within the community, the lack of engagement is believed to be largely due to authorities not seeing the Turkish communities as having any major problems or needing to be responded to in terms of public policy.

Major issues for the community that emerged from the study centred on women and youth issues. Community based groups are perceived as not having adequate funds to deal with these issues, and most fundraise internally for various events such as sports and educational purposes. Public authority support for community organisations is seen as sporadic and small, and organisations that provide a range of services, and which are well regarded in the community, are overwhelmed by the demands they face. In this context there is little scope to build effective services that can serve the needs of young people, women and different communities.
Specific recommendations arising from community respondents include:

- The need for funding support and cross-community capacity building, both for specific Turkish groups, such as women organisations, and for the wider community as a whole

- Key service needs include expanded English language provision, provision and support for women and young people, and the need to address significant educational, health (specifically substance abuse), employment and domestic violence issues that exist within the community

- Support and facilitation of activities and approaches that help address the intergenerational conflicts and divides that are contributing to the challenges and problems facing young people.

Other recommendations:

- The Turkish speaking community in the UK has a rich and relatively long history. It is important that there is better documentation of their history and contribution to British society. We would recommend that a project similar to the ‘Moroccan Memories’ project is supported to provide a strong historical footprint of the Turkish speaking community in London and the UK. This would also provide a greater sense of belonging within the UK, particularly for younger members of the community who may not know the history of the community in the UK

- There is also a notable absence of specific research on the Kurdish community in the UK. The scope of this study did not provide us with enough data to provide a separate overview of the challenges facing Kurdish populations in the UK, and therefore a better understanding for policy makers and practitioners

- Given the number of times respondents mentioned the issue of domestic violence, and suicide amongst young people as a response to questions about issues facing the community, we recommend further research in these areas to determine the extent of these problems, as well as to assist in the development of culturally appropriate strategies to address these issues.

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2 With support from the Heritage Lottery Fund, Moroccan Memories in Britain is a national project run by the Migrant and Refugee Communities Forum. The project aims to bridge a historical gap between past and post 1960 Moroccan migration to Britain by creating an oral and visual history archive collection. www.moroccanmemories.org.uk/
2 Introduction

Communities and Local Government recognises that there is a need to enhance its understanding and knowledge of the diverse Muslim ethnic populations in England, particularly relating to some of the specific smaller communities of African, Middle Eastern and other Asian countries of origin. As such, Communities and Local Government commissioned The Change Institute (CI) to deliver the research project ‘Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities’ (UMEC). The 13 ethnic Muslim communities that the Cohesion Directorate was seeking more information about were those originating from:

- Afghanistan
- Algeria
- Bangladesh
- Egypt
- India
- Iran
- Iraq
- Morocco
- Nigeria
- Pakistan
- Saudi Arabia
- Somalia
- Turkey.

Reports have been provided under separate covers for each diaspora community, along with separate synthesis and technical reports.

2.1 Objectives of the research

There were four objectives for the research:

- **Mapping**: Population maps for each ethnic community outlining the spread of the population and identification of high density clusters
- **Identification of denominations and pathways**: Information on the grassroots institutions/key individuals working with ethnic communities and the breakdown of these ethnic communities by denomination/sect/clan
• **Identifying strength of links and capacity of ethnic communities**: Information on the strength of links between each ethnic community and country of origin (including influential institutions/individuals/media channels/religious influences). Information on the relative strengths and weaknesses of civil society infrastructure for each ethnic community, highlighting where capacities need to be developed.

• **Identifying how government can best engage with ethnic communities**: Recommendations on the ways in which the department of Communities and Local Government can best engage with ethnic communities in England on the Prevent agenda, including recommendations on avenues of communications and delivery to these communities.

The six key questions the study needed to address were:

1. Where are the key ethnic groups of the Muslim population located?
2. What are the latest estimated sizes and demographic make-up of the key ethnic communities?
3. Which denominations and/or other internal groupings do these ethnic groups belong to?
4. How can Communities and Local Government best engage with them?
5. What are the strength of links between the ethnic communities and country of origin?
6. How developed is the level of social infrastructure for each group?

During the course of the desktop research and fieldwork, we obtained data on other facets of the community such as socio economic position and intra-community dynamics. In order to provide additional context to users of the report we have included this information where it was felt this would be valuable to the reader. However, it should be noted a comprehensive socio economic description or analysis of the community was outside the scope of this study. We also took the view that the migration and country of origin history of each community was important and often offered potential explanations for the location, intra-community dynamics, politics and development of the diaspora communities in the UK.

**2.2 Report structure**

The report is structured to address the key research questions set out previously. Sections 6 and 7 are primarily based on quantitative secondary data. Sections 8 to 13 draw primarily on the qualitative research corroborated by secondary sources where these are available. Finally, section 13 draws together specific recommendations arising from the research.
3 Methodology

The research questions represented a broad area of inquiry and analysis. While quantitative data about the size, location and other demographic features of the priority communities was a key research need, the study primarily focused on enabling the Communities and Local Government to ‘know’ these communities in depth.

To fulfil these research requirements, the methodology developed needed to combine documentary research with processes of consultation and dialogue. Data collection consisted of two phases which were consistent across each community.

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<tr>
<th>PHASE</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>METHOD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Population mapping</td>
<td>Review of:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Existing literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• National data sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Local data sources and consultations with Local Authority, other public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>bodies and community representatives.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>These were conducted to cover all 13 communities in this study.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Qualitative data collection</td>
<td>Community interviews (205 total, 21 with Turkish speaking community).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Focus groups (30 total, two with Turkish speaking community and four with</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim youth from all ethnic backgrounds).</td>
</tr>
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</table>

In addition, we conducted 15 interviews with local government and voluntary services stakeholders across England to discuss their existing experiences of working in partnership with and supporting Muslim civil society organisations across all the Muslim ethnic communities that we researched.

3.1 Project phases

**Phase 1: Population mapping**

The first phase consisted of collecting mainly secondary quantitative data but also some primary qualitative data about locations of Muslim ethnic populations and known civil society organisations. The main method for data collection on population characteristics was through a comprehensive review of a broad range of secondary data sources, including the 2001 Census, the Annual Population Survey, output of migration and population think tanks and academic research centres. This initial literature review assisted in developing a detailed picture of data currently available in the public domain, and in identifying key gaps in the existing knowledge base. It also
helped in identifying key locations for each diaspora to be targeted in the community research which followed as well as identifying key stakeholders and community interviewees.

Robust and up-to-date population data is difficult to obtain outside of the 2001 Census but we were able to obtain some anecdotal information from Local Authorities and community groups about migration since 2001. However, the 2001 Census data still informs the baseline of the population figures quoted in this study. This data has been supplemented where possible by a limited amount of additional Local Authority information or other sources where reliable estimates have been made.

In relation to the Turkish speaking community specifically, much of the secondary data available from local authorities was variable and focused primarily with issues relating to educational underachievement amongst young Turks, making it difficult to construct an appropriate picture of the Turkish speaking community as a whole. However, other important studies included fien and Yayincilik’s *Euro-Turks: the Presence of Turks in Europe and their Future*, alongside Enneli, Modood and Bradley, *Young Turks and Kurds: A set of ‘invisible’ disadvantaged groups* and Kulcukan’s *The Making of Turkish-Muslim Diaspora in Britain: Religious Collective Identity in a Multicultural Public Sphere*.

**Phase 2: Qualitative data collection**

Qualitative data collection has been undertaken primarily through 21 one-to-one interviews with key respondents (‘those who might be expected to know’), and two focus groups with representatives of different communities. This phase of the research was carried out between April and July 2008.

**3.1.1 In-depth interviews**

The interviews assisted in developing an overview of national and local contexts: the make-up of diaspora communities, key issues concerning violent extremism including perceptions, experiences and activities, current initiatives in place to counter this and existing civil society structures and development needs. The interviews also assisted in identification of further key contacts for the one-to-one and focus group research and covered a range of topics including:

- Key data sources
- Denominations and pathways
- Key influencers and institutions
- Key issues and needs for the specific Diaspora
- Links with countries of origin

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3 Dr. Faruk fien, Günizi Yayincilik (2008), *Euro-Turks: the Presence of Turks in Europe and their Future*, Turkish Research Centre Association.


• Civil society structures and capacity needs
• Current levels of contact and key barriers to engagement with public authorities
• Media consumption
• Appropriate communication channels for engagement and involvement.

The majority of interviews were conducted face-to-face and some by telephone where necessary.

Respondents were chosen on the basis that they offered a range of different types of knowledge and perspectives on community issues and dynamics.

Selection of interviewees involved drawing up a ‘long list’ of key contacts in each community in consultation with community interviewers, expert advisers and contacts made during the first phase of research. Shortlists were produced to ensure that there was adequate female and youth representation and a regional spread that reflected the distribution of the community in England. Additional names were added on the basis of subsequent recommendations made.

Interviews for the Turkish speaking community research were conducted by a researcher from the community. The researcher was already familiar with many of the civil society organisations in the Turkish speaking community in London and Leicester. This added legitimacy to the process of enquiry that was critical in opening up discussion and enabled us to gather rich and sometimes controversial data.

3.1.2 Interviewee profile

Nineteen interviews were held in Greater London, with two conducted outside London.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Age profile of respondents</th>
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<tr>
<td>Age 20-29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age 30-39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age 40-49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age 50-59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age 60+</td>
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</table>
A quality control process was used by the Change Institute (CI) to ensure consistency and quality across each community. This involved:

- **Piloting**: Each community researcher was required to carry out two/three pilot interviews in each community to refine approaches and questions where necessary. This included a detailed discussion with each researcher following the pilot interviews, with expert adviser involvement where necessary, as well as a review of the interview field notes to ensure that relevant data was being picked up by researchers.

- Each community researcher was assigned to a member of the core research team who reviewed field notes on an ongoing basis. Regular internal team meetings were held to share findings and ensure consistency across the project.

### 3.1.3 Discussion groups

In addition to the individual interviews, we conducted two focus groups that allowed for collective insights to be generated on community needs and issues, including challenges and practical ways forward. These explored partnership issues, civil society infrastructure and capacity development needs, media and communications. While these focus groups were limited in number, they provided a rich and often diverse set of views that complemented the data gathered in the one-to-one interviews.

Focus groups were designed to include a mix of participants from different community networks and different occupational backgrounds who might be expected to hold a wide range of views. Participants were recruited by the core research team through local community organisations and CI networks.

One male and one female focus group was conducted, which were attended by individuals over 35 years of age. The focus groups were conducted in London and Leicester in June and July 2008 in collaboration with two community organisations, one predominantly serving the Turkish Cypriot community, and one serving the Turkish mainland community. The focus groups were attended by a total of fifteen participants and were facilitated by the Change Institute, with additional support from community researchers. Language translation was required for some members of the female focus group.

<table>
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<th>Table 2: Sex of respondents</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<table>
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<th>Table 3: Ethnicity of respondents (self-reported)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Cypriot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to the two focus groups for each community, four youth focus groups were conducted in London, Birmingham and Bradford with youth from a range of ethnic backgrounds. The findings of these focus groups are discussed in the summary report.

This report uses selective quotes from the interviews and focus groups to illustrate key recurring themes and issues arising during the qualitative data collection. Where necessary they have been carefully edited for ease of reading, or understanding what was meant.

### 3.2 Analysis of data

Data analysis involved generating understandable patterns by comparing what different respondents/focus groups said about specific themes or questions. The central question was whether the data and information and the range of views expressed led to the same conclusions. Findings were validated by triangulation of all data and information collected in both project phases so far as possible and by critical internal reflection and review within the CI team.

The analytical process involved reviewing field notes to develop emerging themes in line with the analytical framework, which was done in collaboration with the field researchers; regular internal meetings to discuss findings from all communities; dedicated internal workshops on the communities to finalise analysis; reviews from expert advisers; feedback from ‘community reviewers’ and a formal peer review process.
Intercultural understanding of responses and non-responses was also essential in considerations of the data generated. A set of commonly held assumptions and understandings in any cultural group may mean that some things are simply left unsaid – because they are commonly understood in the group and do not require articulation. In addition literal translation or interpretation may simply misrepresent or miss the significance of what is being articulated. In this context in particular there will often be a distinction between what is said and might be noted or recorded and what is meant. In looking for meaning, silences and body language were often as important as what was said. A good example of potential misinterpretation that came up many times was body language indicating discomfort and unwillingness to pursue a particular line of enquiry.

Finally and most importantly, we were reflexive in our approach, critically reflecting on the role and influence that our own research intervention may be having on key respondents and focus groups, using critical judgment and being conscious of the need to interpret with integrity in relation to what we were seeing and hearing.

### 3.3 Limitations of the research

Data analysis represents both general and particular challenges in the current social and political context, as well as specific challenges in relation to some of these communities. These include:

- The sample sizes for each community were relatively small and respondents were not intended to be a representative sample of the relevant communities.

- Because the interviews were not based on a random sample, the study does not claim to provide an analysis of the Turkish speaking population as a whole, nor was this the intention of the study. We have analysed views and comments in the context of existing data, knowledge of the current political and social context for these communities and the comments of other respondents.

- Many aspects of the topic guide were designed to identify the key needs and challenges facing the community. Hence the research tended to generate data on problem areas and challenges, particularly in focus group discussions when respondents felt they had limited time to ensure that their voices got heard. This may not reflect many of the positive and optimistic views of respondents. However, respondents were often aware that the discussions may come across as negative in tone and were quick to try and balance this by highlighting perceived positive aspects of both their communities and their lives in the UK. We have endeavoured to set out the ‘best’ story (in terms of explanatory power) in the context of what is already known about why some of our respondents might express negative feelings.

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6 The topic guide is included in the Technical Report, available from Communities and Local Government.
• In the current context, the politicisation of the research field meant that all respondents were conscious of being part of a community under public and government scrutiny. Respondents were made aware of the purposes of the research through a ‘showcard’ that explained the research as well as possible uses of the research. They were informed that this research would potentially be used to inform a publication that would enter the public domain and would cover aspects such as religion, intra-community dynamics and links with country of origin. A climate of some scepticism within Muslim communities, discrimination, both real and perceived and awareness of government interest in ‘what is happening’ on the ground, meant that respondents were often sceptical about the use of the information that they were providing. Many will have had agendas (for positive as well as negative reasons) when asked about issues for their communities, which may have influenced their responses (eg representing their community as having few or no problems, or conversely, as having many or major needs and/or issues with public authorities)

• This also created a number of practical difficulties in research terms, including difficulties in getting interviews with particular types of respondents, hesitancy and caution in some responses and a closing off of some lines of questioning in relation to religion, identity and differences

• The researchers’ analytical response to these difficulties was to be critically attuned to who was speaking, their location in the community, the interests that they may have and to judge their comments in the light of this context. Researchers were aware that there are dynamic and charged debates and movement taking place within these communities on a whole range of issues ranging from religion, its expression and orientation in the context of being Muslim minorities living in a non-Muslim society, to negotiations about roles, responsibilities, duties, gender relations, and relationships with country of origin. This awareness underpinned the analysis of the data and the conclusions drawn from responses received.

For all these reasons, the research should be viewed as a ‘snapshot’ in time rather than reflective of the full complexity or range of issues, challenges and changes taking place in these communities (eg intergenerational relationships, gender roles, perceptions of ethnic and religious identity, changing attitudes among the young (both in liberal and more radical directions) and the levels of integration or tensions within and across communities). We are conscious of the dynamism and the rapid changes taking place in some communities, both positive and negative.
The Republic of Turkey is geo-politically significant due to its unique and vast history and its geographical location. Current estimates of the population of Turkey stand between 72.5 million and 74.8 million, 99 per cent of which is Muslim. While the Constitution provides for freedom of religion, the Government imposes certain restrictions on Muslim and other religious groups, and on Muslim religious expression in government offices and state-run institutions, including universities. 50 per cent of Turkey’s population is below the age of 28, and 26 per cent are under the age of 14 years.

The secular Republic of Turkey was established in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal later honoured with the title ‘Ataturk’ or ‘Father of the Turks’ out of the remnants of the defeated Ottoman Empire following the First World War. Under his leadership as the Republic’s first president, the country adopted wide-ranging social, legal, and political reforms with the aim of founding a new secular republic, clearly distinguishable from its Ottoman past. These reforms sought to erase the legacy of dominance by religion and tradition, and affected every aspect of Turkish life. ‘Ataturk’s Reforms’ included the right to exercise popular sovereignty through representative democracy, the

adoption of a new constitution that negated the final vestiges of Islamic law, the installation of a secular education system, the closure of many religious orders, the extension of voting rights to women and the right to elected office. The inclusion of *laïcité*\(^{11}\) into the constitution in 1937 was seen as the final act in the project of instituting complete separation between governmental and religious affairs in Turkey.

Despite restrictions placed on political parties by the constitution, religion has continued to play a role in political mobilisation and discourse. Since the end of the single party period in 1945, Turkey has witnessed frequent tensions over the role of religion in political affairs – these tensions often involve the Turkish military who regard themselves as defenders of the secular constitution. The country experienced a number of military coup d’états in 1960, 1971 and 1980. In 1997, a ‘post-modern’ coup was engineered by military commanders to overthrow the Islamic-orientated Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*) coalition government led by Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan resigned following pressure from the National Security Council (NSC) and the party was subsequently ordered to close in 1998 by the Constitutional Court for ‘Islamist activities’ and attempts to ‘redefine the secular nature of the Republic’.\(^{12}\)

Turkey’s preservation and maintenance of its secular identity continues to be a profound issue and source of tension particularly in an era which is witnessing an increasing attraction to a religious identity by its people. It is argued that Turkish secularism unduly restricts individual religious freedom, with debates arising over the degree to which religious observance ought to be restricted to the private sphere, most famously in connection with the issues of head scarves and religious-based political parties. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, of the ruling conservative Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* or *AKP*), has spoken out in favour of limited Islamism, and against the active restrictions on wearing head scarves (*hijab*) in government institutions, such as schools, universities and the civil service. The ban in universities was briefly lifted in early 2008, but subsequently reinstated by court order. These concerns were also hotly debated in the lead up to the 2007 presidential elections, in which the AKP chose a presidential candidate with Islamist connections. The AKP went on to win a larger than expected share of votes, and Abdullah Gül, whose wife wears a headscarf, became the president of Turkey. However, recent developments have included a series of ongoing confrontations between the AKP and Turkey’s secular elite, with the Constitutional Court mediating a case to ban the party and imposing financial sanctions.

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\(^{11}\) *Laïcité* is broadly a separation of religion from public affairs but can take many forms – for example, in Turkey religious education is permitted but only under the strict control of the state whereas in France privately supported religious education is allowed. Under the Turkish constitution no political party can claim to represent a form of religious belief.

\(^{12}\) FCO (2008), Country profile: Turkey. www.fco.gov.uk
Turkey is a founding member of the United Nations (1945), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1973), the G20 industrial nations (1999), and among the earliest members of NATO (1952). Relations with Europe have always been a central part of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey became a founding member of the Council of Europe in 1949 and an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC) (predecessor of the European Union) in 1963. After decades of political negotiations, it officially began formal accession negotiations in 2005. The accession process has proved to be a protracted affair due to fears expressed by some existing Member States about Turkey’s size and Muslim population, as well as over the depth of disagreements over disputes with EU member, the Republic of Cyprus, concerning Turkey’s 1974 military intervention to prevent the island’s annexation to Greece. Since then, Turkey has supported the Turkish Cypriot community in the form of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is only recognised by Turkey.

Turkey also has longstanding ties with the United States which were initially based on its geostrategic importance during the Cold War years. This relationship has continued in light of volatility in the Middle East and Turkey has largely benefitted from diplomatic, economic and political support from the US. Turkey hosts an important NATO air base near the Turkish border with Syria and Iraq for US operations in the region.

However, the new foreign policy of outreach towards the Middle East adopted by the AKP has unnerved Washington, with concerns that Turkey is inexorably being drawn back into the Middle East and Asia, and away from its long-standing anchorage in NATO and the West.

The Turkish Armed Forces is the second largest standing armed force in NATO after the US Armed Forces. The Armed Forces continue to exercise significant political influence in Turkey, and in recent years senior members of the armed forces have increased their public comments on domestic and foreign policy questions including on Cyprus, secularism and Kurdish issues, as well as reacting publicly to government statements or decisions. There have also been several attempts from senior members of the armed forces to restrict academic research and public debate in Turkey, in particular on security and minority rights issues.
5 Migration History and Trends

Despite the absence of colonial links, the Turkish are one of the largest migrant groups in Western Europe with around 5.2 million Turks living in the 27 countries of the European Union.\(^\text{15}\) Around two million live in Germany and 300,000 in the Netherlands.\(^\text{16}\) While there is a minority population of around one million people of Turkish descent living in Bulgaria and Romania, the remaining population is mostly a result of immigration to European Union countries from the 1950s onwards, with organised labour migration occurring from 1961 following a bilateral agreement between Germany and Turkey. In addition to Western Europe, a large number of Turkish migrants have settled in USA (130,000), the Russian Federation (30,000), Saudi Arabia (100,000) and Australia (52,000).\(^\text{17}\)

The population in Britain is unique by comparison with the Turkish communities in Western Europe because of the large Turkish Cypriot population. Each of the three ethnic groups also has a separate migration history, alongside different experiences of integration. Some of these differences are due to their cultural, social and historical backgrounds in Turkey and Cyprus. Turkish society in Turkey is not homogeneous and its heterogeneity is reflected in the Turkish-speaking communities throughout Europe, including Britain. A report by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) on ‘Young Turks and Kurds’ concluded that:

*The Turkish community in London is characterised by complex interrelationships that possess commonalities in terms of its economic situation, culture, religion and external links with the global Turkish-speaking community. The report points to a heterogeneous community, including three groups of migrants with three different historical and social backgrounds, which inevitably have affected ethnic, social and economic relations between the communities in London.*\(^\text{18}\)

The presence of Turkish Cypriots is an important feature of the British story because they have not settled in such numbers in any other European country. Turkish Cypriots formed the first of the UK Turkish speaking communities and unlike other Turkish-speaking migrants, they had a colonial connection with Britain. They first migrated to Britain in significant numbers between 1945 and 1955 due to these colonial links, conflict and high levels of employment here in the post-war years.\(^\text{19}\) Migration slowed following the UK Immigration Act of 1962 and subsequent Turkish Cypriot immigrants arrived either through family reunification or as refugees following the 1974 war in Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots are latecomers compared to their Greek counterparts and were initially dependent on the Greek Cypriot community for employment and assistance in housing. Before the partition of Cyprus in 1974,\(^\text{20}\) the two communities

\(^\text{15}\) Sen, 2008.
\(^\text{17}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{18}\) Enneli, Modood and Bradley, 2005.
\(^\text{19}\) Ansari, H (2004), *The Infidel Within, Muslims in Britain Since 1800*, C. Hurst and Co.
\(^\text{20}\) For detail on the Cyprus civil war, partition and the accompanying migration to Britain see Gilles Bertrand, ‘Cypriots in Britain: Diaspora(s) committed to peace?’, *Turkish Studies*, 5:2, 93-110.
Migration History and Trends

were perceived as relating fairly harmoniously, though not socialising outside of work settings.\textsuperscript{21} Turkish Cypriots are the most settled and prosperous of the various groups (although some Turkish Cypriots have arrived in the UK as refugees) and nearly two-thirds of young Turkish Cypriots now living in Britain were born here.\textsuperscript{22}

Turkish migration from mainland Turkey to the UK did not start until the late 1960s and was largely a consequence of limited employment opportunities in Turkey.\textsuperscript{23} In contrast to migration to other European countries, migration from both Turkey and Cyprus to Britain was neither organised nor regulated by the government. As a result, migration routes were not chosen by Turkish government policy, as was the case with migration to other European countries. Instead, they were largely determined by individual initiatives and chain migration by using social networks. The Turkish population in the UK is mainly from cities such as Izmir and Ankara as well as the Black Sea region and some rural areas.

Ethnic Kurds began to enter in larger numbers during the late 1980s and early 1990s, often with refugee and asylum seeker status, and at a time when the economic circumstances in the UK were far less favourable.

There was a significant rise in asylum applications to the UK from Turkey between 1997 and 2000 followed by a steep drop after this point as shown in Chart 1. Anecdotal evidence from the community suggests that this increase was due to Britain’s recognition of the plight of the Kurds, which led to many people claiming asylum in Britain from Turkey because of the perception that the political conditions were more favourable for their claims. Between 1989 and 2003, 33,972 Turkish nationals sought asylum which represents 92 per cent of all applications from Turkey between 1980 and 2006.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Ennelli, Modood and Bradley, 2005.
Between 1991 and 2006, 52,120 Turkish nationals were given grants of settlement, with 25,095 individuals being given leave to remain since 2001. Nearly 50,000 Turkish nationals (49,875) have been granted British citizenship since 1980, including 44,190 since 1998 – see Chart 2.
6 Community Demography and Key Locations


2001 Census: Cyprus-born Muslims in England: 17,915

As with other populations, there are significant variations in estimates for the Turkish speaking population in the UK. This is compounded by the fact that a large proportion of those who would call themselves ‘Turkish’ were born in and emigrated from Cyprus and there is a significant British born population that is not captured in official data. It has been estimated that there are 80,000 Turkish people living in Britain, of whom 60,000 live in London. In addition, there are estimated to be 130,000 Turkish Cypriots. A 2005 report by JRF estimated the Turkish speaking population at 200,000.

Official data is only available by country of birth. The 2006 Labour Force Survey estimates 69,000 Turkish people by country of birth, while the 2001 census estimated the total number of Turkish the UK at being 52,396, with 39,122 in London. 39,357 or 75 per cent of the Turkey-born population were Muslim. The census only records migrants born in Cyprus, which includes both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. However, an approximation can be derived by using Census data on religion. There were 74,771 Cyprus-born migrants in England in 2001 of which 17,915 (24 per cent) were Muslim and likely to be Turkish Cypriot. These statistics do not include ethnic Turkish, Kurdish or Turkish Cypriots born in the UK so are likely to be significantly lower than the total Turkish speaking population in England, particularly given that the community has been here in significant numbers since the 1960s. Data on language would be likely to produce a much more accurate estimate of the Turkish speaking community as a whole in many cases.

The Turkish speaking community is heavily concentrated in the Greater London region even by comparison to most Muslim ethnic communities with 76 per cent of the Turkey-born Muslim population and 89 per cent of the Cyprus-born Muslim population living in London in 2001. Outside of London there are smaller communities in Birmingham, Hertfordshire, Luton, Manchester, Sheffield and the East Midlands.

24 Ibid.
25 Turkish Embassy: www.turkishembassylondon.org/canon/turks.htm
26 Includes Turkish Cypriots and irrespective of religion. Enneli, Modood and Bradley, 2005.
27 Institute for Public Policy Research (2007), Britain’s Immigrants: An economic profile, London: IPPR.
Turkish Cypriots were thought by respondents to be the main ethnic group within the Muslim Turkish speaking community. However, based on country of birth data, census figures show that there were double the number of Turkey-born Muslims than Cyprus-born Muslims in 2001 – although these figures do not account for the British-born population. Table 4 and Table 5 show the percentage of the Turkey-born and Cyprus-born populations in Government Office regions who are Muslim, along with the total number of Turkey-born and Cyprus-born Muslims in each area.

### Table 4: Distribution of Turkey-born Muslim population in Government Office Regions in England (Source: Census 2001, C0644)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GO Region</th>
<th>Turkey-born population</th>
<th>Turkey-born Muslims</th>
<th>% of Turkey-born population in each GOR who are Muslim</th>
<th>% of total Turkey-born Muslim population in England</th>
<th>Turkey-born Muslims as % of regional Muslim population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>39,122</td>
<td>29,761</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>3,714</td>
<td>2,516</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>2,475</td>
<td>1,757</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>1,449</td>
<td>1,087</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Midlands</td>
<td>1,404</td>
<td>1,073</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>1,416</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire and the Humber</td>
<td>1,187</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>1,113</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>52,396</strong></td>
<td><strong>39,257</strong></td>
<td><strong>75</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When Turkish Cypriots first arrived in London, they settled in the Euston and Camden areas, later moving to Seven Sisters, Haringey, Palmers Green and Enfield. There are now Turkish speaking populations in Lewisham, Lambeth, Southwark, Croydon, Enfield, Islington, Kensington, Waltham Forest, Wood Green and Hackney. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Kurdish people arrived in London, mostly as refugees. Again, there is no study showing the historical trend of their movement within London, but, unlike Cypriots and Turks, they are reported to have settled mainly in Haringey and Hackney. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the Turkey-born population in London in 2001 highlighting the concentration in the north London suburbs. 66 per cent of Turkey-born Muslims in London live in four north London boroughs (Enfield, Hackney, Haringey, Islington). Figure 5 shows the distribution of the Cyprus-born population again dominant in northern boroughs but also significant populations in the southern boroughs of Southwark and Lewisham.

Table 5: Distribution of Cyprus-born Muslim population in Government Office Regions in England (Source: Census 2001, C0644)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GO Region</th>
<th>Cyprus-born population</th>
<th>Cyprus-born Muslims</th>
<th>% of Cyprus-born population in each GOR who are Muslim</th>
<th>% of total Cyprus-born Muslim population in England</th>
<th>Cyprus-born Muslims as % of total Muslim population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>45,898</td>
<td>15,997</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>5,630</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>6,741</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>3,224</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>3,002</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Midlands</td>
<td>3,063</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>3,849</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire and the Humber</td>
<td>2,453</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>74,771</td>
<td>17,915</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 and Table 7 list the percentage of the Turkey-born and Cyprus-born populations that are Muslim in each London borough along with the total number of Turkey-born and Cypriot-born Muslims in each area. The Cyprus-born Muslim populations vary considerably as a percentage of the total Cyprus-born population. While Enfield and Haringey have the largest number of Cyprus-born Muslims, they only comprise 33 per cent and 34 per cent of the total Cyprus-born populations in those boroughs. By contrast 65 per cent of the Cyprus-born population in Hackney is Muslim.
### Table 6: Turkey-born Muslim population in London Local Authority areas
(Source: 2001 Census, C0644)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Borough</th>
<th>Turkey-born population</th>
<th>Turkey-born Muslims</th>
<th>% of Turkey-born population who are Muslim</th>
<th>Turkey-born Muslims as % of total Muslim population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haringey</td>
<td>8,588</td>
<td>6,450</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hackney</td>
<td>7,728</td>
<td>6,089</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enfield</td>
<td>6,176</td>
<td>4,716</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islington</td>
<td>3,122</td>
<td>2,338</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waltham Forest</td>
<td>1,728</td>
<td>1,322</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croydon</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnet</td>
<td>1,133</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwark</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewisham</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of London and Westminster</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7: Cyprus-born Muslim population in London Local Authority areas
(Source: 2001 Census, C0644)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Borough</th>
<th>Cyprus-born population</th>
<th>Cyprus-born Muslims</th>
<th>% of Cyprus-born population who are Muslim</th>
<th>Cyprus-born Muslims as % of total Muslim population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enfield</td>
<td>11,803</td>
<td>3,937</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haringey</td>
<td>6,037</td>
<td>2,076</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hackney</td>
<td>2,238</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewisham</td>
<td>1,940</td>
<td>1,428</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwark</td>
<td>1,911</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waltham Forest</td>
<td>1,698</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islington</td>
<td>2,313</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenwich</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redbridge</td>
<td>1,394</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnet</td>
<td>3,586</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7 Socio economic situation

The most recent Labour Force Survey analysis of Turkey-born migrants is found in the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) publication *Britain’s Immigrants – An economic profile* which uses data from 2005-06. The report shows that the Turkey-born population lags behind the UK population on most socio-economic indicators. For example, 41 per cent of the working age Turkey-born population, excluding students, were employed compared to 78 per cent of the UK population and the average annual income of the economically-active working age Turkey-born population was £14,750 compared to the UK average of £21,250.

The IPPR publication *Beyond Black and White* analysed the difference between new immigrants and settled immigrants by country of birth. Table 8 highlights the data from this study for the Turkey-born population in England, illustrating the slight differences between settled Turkey-born migrants and those who have arrived since 1990. Most significant is the number in full time education, 10.5 per cent compared to 0.6 per cent for settled immigrants, possibly because newer migrants are likely to have a younger profile than those that arrived before 1990.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New immigrants (arrived since 1990)</th>
<th>Settled immigrants (arrived prior to 1990)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>53.3% male</td>
<td>58.8% male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low earners33</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High earners34</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Education35</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher qualifications36</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30 Sarah Kyambi (2005), *Beyond Black and White – Mapping new immigrant communities*, IPPR.
31 Respondents noted that the educational provision and attainment of Turkish Cypriots entering the UK from Cyprus was considerably poorer than that of Greek Cypriots and so statistics on the Cypriot born population are unlikely to be particularly applicable to the Turkish Cypriot minority.
32 Kyambi, 2005.
33 Earning less than half the median income of the British-born population.
34 Earning above £750 per week.
35 Including those in higher education.
36 Above secondary level and including degree or equivalent qualifications.
Employment in the Turkish speaking community was dominated by the textile industries in the 1970s and the demise of these had a profound effect on the economic status of the community, leading to mass unemployment among the Turkish speaking community. Those of the older generation, the first migrants of the community, did not have the skills set to venture into another industry, particularly as many had emigrated from rural areas in Turkey at a young age with a lack of education. Some found other work, but others drifted into long term unemployment or even crime.37

However, since then the situation of the community has improved considerably and the Turkish economic presence is now felt across London and England, although it is most visible in Haringey’s Green Lanes and Hackney’s Stoke Newington and Kingsland Roads. Here the communities have created an ‘array of Turkish shops, cafes, markets and businesses that will give you a little taste of Turkey.’38 The entrepreneurship of the community is apparent in terms of small and medium size business ownership, with ownership and work in the restaurant/catering sector still important. Data from the 2005-06 Annual Population Survey indicates that 35 per cent of the economically-active working-age Turkish born population is self-employed compared to 13 per cent of the total UK economically-active working-age population.39 The socio economic status of the community has been boosted as many have become more affluent, establishing chains of restaurants and supermarkets. Such businesses are still regarded as family establishments and many have been handed down to children, or there is an expectation of children taking over the businesses. However, there were concerns expressed by some respondents that Turkish entrepreneurs are still reliant on funding from family sources rather than taking advantage of financial opportunities from the wider community.

Respondents noted differences between the socio economic circumstances of the Kurdish, Turkish and Cypriot communities. Turkish Cypriots are generally perceived as more advantaged and more likely to be in professional occupations because they have been here for a longer period. Kurds, as the newest migrant group, are reported to suffer the highest levels of disadvantage within the Turkish speaking community, in part linked to having much higher proportions of people with refugee status, although it was stressed by some that many Turkish Cypriots also came as refugees. This pattern is thought to be repeating itself in the next generation, with British born Kurdish males perceived as more likely to be unemployed compared to British born Turkish Cypriot and Turkish males.

37 Focus group respondent, male 55+.
7.1 Education and housing

Education was seen as one of the most pressing issues for the community by respondents, particularly amongst the Turkish speaking youth as there is a perceived low level of educational attainment. Housing was also seen as important with respondents stating that many families suffer from poor social housing, overcrowding, which is particularly a problem for larger families. According to Annual Population Survey statistics in 2005-06, only 35 per cent of migrants born in Turkey own or have bought their own home with a mortgage or loan compared to 75 per cent of the total UK population and 49 per cent of migrants born in Turkey are in social housing compared to 17 per cent of the total UK population.\(^{40}\) While respondents perceive overcrowding to be an issue for many within the community, the average household size for migrants born in Turkey (2.3) is below the UK average size (3.0).\(^{41}\)

\(^{40}\) IPPR, 2007. Based on analysis of 2005-06 Annual population Survey data.

\(^{41}\) Ibid.
8 Key characteristics

8.1 Identity

Existing literature that explores identity among the Turkish speaking communities in England highlights the interplay between religion, ethnicity and culture in the formation of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot identity. Gilles Bertrand addresses the Turkish Cypriot identity within the context of the Cyprus conflict, partition and the migration of Cypriots to Britain. In particular, he highlights the complexity of the interplay between Cypriot, Turkish and Muslim identities.42 The JRF’s report on Young Turks and Kurds also addresses the complexity of Turkish Cypriot, Turkish and Kurdish identities in Britain – primarily in the context of their transition to adulthood.43 This study also addresses the ethnic complexity of a group that does not “occupy a clear position on the white/non-white divide on which current understanding of ‘ethnic minorities’ is based”.44

Talip Küçükcan examines the role and diversity of religion in the British Turkish and Turkish Cypriot diaspora. He notes that:

*Islam is one of the indispensable components of Turkish/Cypriot identity. Even those who defined themselves as ‘not religious’ or ‘nominal’ Muslims feel that religion has had public and private influence on the formation of Turkish identity. Institutionalisation of Islam and the growth of Islamic movements among the Turkish community confirm that this perception is widely held. This means that Turkish ethnicity, identity and Islam are closely intertwined and cannot be readily separated from one another. Therefore, it is almost impossible to analyse Turkish identity without reference to Islam.*45

According to respondents in this research many in the Turkish speaking community continue to maintain a strong Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot identity and affiliation to their Turkish and Turkish Cypriot culture, although there are a smaller group of people who are less interested in preserving Turkish and Turkish Cypriot cultural values and practices. Ethnicity impacts on identity formation amongst the diaspora with clear differences amongst Turks, Turkish Kurds and Turkish-Cypriots – although there is considerable inter-mixing between the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot community.

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43 Ennell, Modood and Bradley, 2005.
44 Ennell, Modood and Bradley, 2005.
These strong cultural identities are predominately sustained through the maintenance of family values and strong community networks, as well as through traditions, customs, language, culture and foods. Alongside the preservation of these aspects of their identity within UK society, many people maintain cultural ties to their country of origin through media, business and politics. This is the case for both the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot communities, although respondents felt that there was a greater degree of attachment within the Turkish community. A respondent described this as *living their own Turkey in England*. Another one noted that:

*The Turkish community are nationalistic and define their identity in terms of their ‘Turkishness’. They are overprotective of their country of origin and so are proud. They have a fear of losing their identity and are scared of integration and acquainting themselves with different cultures or traditions.*

On the other hand, younger people who were born and brought up in the UK are seen by respondents to be negotiating their identity in the context of the various cultures they interact with in contemporary British society. The younger generation are perceived as having more of a hybrid Turkish and British identity, with an emphasis on the cultural identity transferred from their parents. Many speak Turkish and Kurdish at home and watch Turkish TV. The majority were reported by respondents to be preserving their ‘Turkishness’ and emphasising it as a source of pride.

One interviewee described her experience of growing up in the UK as typical. As a child she had felt that she ought to believe in Jesus like her English peers, but now her culture gives her a sense of pride and she has integrated into her dual identity. Talking about her generation and the experiences of her peers, she suggested that UK-born Turkish speaking Muslims still experience discrimination, but that they are comfortable growing up in their Turkish culture, and that many have a strong interest and pride in Turkish cultural products, such as music, food and language. However, some respondents felt that while Turkish cultural identity is still strong in the younger generation today, there will be an inevitable shift over the coming decades, with future generations becoming more familiar with, and more integrated into the British culture and lifestyle.

Turkish ethnicity also impacts strongly on identity formation. Turkish Cypriots, who have been established in the UK for a longer period than the other Turkish speaking groups, identify themselves as Turkish Cypriots and not just Turkish. The “Cypriot” reference point is an important element in their self-identification along with the other two reference points of Turkish and British.

46 Community interviewee: Turkish, female, London, 20s.
47 Community interviewee: Turkish, female, London, 20s.
Kurds born or descended from Turkey very much define themselves as Kurdish, and have been able to assert their Kurdish identity in the UK much more comfortably than in Turkey. However, a common issue picked out from the interviews is that they tend to define themselves as “Turkish” rather than Kurdish when officially registering or applying for services, and some respondents believed that about half of registered “Turks” are actually Kurdish.

8.2 Ethnicity

The majority of Turkey’s population is of Turkic ethnicity. Other major ethnic groups include the Kurds, Circassians, Zazas, Bosniaks, Georgians, Albanians, Roma, Arabs and the three officially-recognised minorities of Greeks, Armenians and Jews. A recent report commissioned by the National Security Council of Turkey (MKG), published in June 2008, stated that there are approximately 50 to 55 million ethnic Turks; 12.5 million Kurds (including 3 million Zazas); 2.5 million Circassians (Adige); 2 million Bosniaks; 1.3 million Albanians; 1 million Georgians; 870,000 Arabs; 700,000 Roma; 600,000 Pomaks; 80,000 Lazs; 60,000 Armenians; 20,000 Jews; 15,000 Greeks and 13,000 Hemshins living in Turkey.48

Kurds are the largest non-Turkish group and are mainly concentrated in the southeast of the country. Economic disadvantage, discrimination and human rights violations against Kurds and Kurdish separatist claims have led to the growth of insurgent movements. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), now known as the People’s Congress of Kurdistan or Kongra-Gel (KGK), has dominated the Turkish military’s attention and is the best known of the Kurdish movements. In 1984 it launched a guerilla campaign for an ethnic homeland in the predominantly Kurdish southeast. Thousands died and hundreds of thousands became refugees in the conflict between the PKK and the army during the 1980s and 1990s.49 The PKK is considered a terrorist group by the Turkish government, the US and the European Union, which is a point of considerable contention as some other countries do not endorse this view. Rebel attacks, which had subsided after the 1999 capture of the group’s leader, have surged again in recent years and the relationship between the PKK and the Turkish government remains unresolved.

The heterogeneity of Turkey is reflected in the Turkish-speaking communities in London. The ethnic groups identified within the Turkish speaking community in England are Kurds, Laz, Circassians (from Anatolia/central Turkey) and Turkish Cypriots. However, most respondents noted that the main perceived distinctions are between Turkish Cypriots, Kurds and mainland Turks. Responses from interviewees from the three different groups indicate that there is quite a high level of differentiation and the prevalence of negative views about each other between the groups.

Turkish Cypriots are a distinctive community in Britain, as this group is not present in other European countries. According to respondents, most Turkish Cypriots

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48 Türkiyedeki Kürtlerin Sayısı! /’Number of Kurds in Turkey!’; Milliyet, 06.06.08
49 Country Profile: Turkey, BBC: www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/1022222.stm (29.11.08).
see anybody from mainland Turkey as ‘a Turk’. Kurds see themselves as a relatively united ethnic group in which people ‘always support each other’, but stress that there is a marked distance between Kurds and Turks. According to one Turkish respondent:

*There is a lack of communication between [Turks and Kurds] as they are uncomfortable with each other. More established Turks resent the Kurds as they have established themselves economically quicker than the Turks first did.*

Each of these groups is seen as having a distinctive background and set of issues, problems and needs. Since some of these differences are due to their cultural, social and historical backgrounds in Turkey and Cyprus, these differences usually emerge during their interactions with each other. However, there is also a degree of social mixing and intermarriage between these three groups, as there is with the majority population. The distinct identities of these groups are increasingly being recognised by local authorities, some of which have started to break down local ethnic monitoring categories in Turkish Cypriot, Turkish and Kurdish, alongside the White Other category which was commonly used for self identification by many Turkish people.

There have also been significant tensions between young Turkish and Kurdish men, often escalating into violence. For example in 2002, following an altercation in a social club in Haringey, an armed battle broke out between more than forty Turkish and Kurdish men. While these incidents were mentioned by some respondents they were not addressed in detail.

### 8.3 Religion

According to the 2001 Census of the English population, 75 per cent of migrants born in Turkey, and 24 per cent of migrants born in Cyprus are Muslim. In the UK, the majority of the Turkish community belong to the Sunni sect of Islam, mainly adhering to *Hanafi* School of thought. Sunni Kurds, who are originally from Northern Iraq and Eastern Turkey, tend to follow the *Shafi* School of thought. These schools can be broken down further into various denominations and currents followed by religious practitioners in the community. Examples of these include the *Nurcus*, who are followers of Fetullah Gülen, recently named the world's top public intellectual in a reader’s poll commissioned by Foreign Policy magazine. The *Nur Cemati* (society) that follows Gülen’s ideas and teachings has become very active in the religious scene among the Turkish community nationally and internationally. Other denominations and currents include the *Suleymancis*, aligned to the Suleymaniye Mosque in East London, and followers of Shenazi Kibris, a Sufi religious figure in Northern Cyprus who has seen a growing number of British converts, including some members of the Turkish speaking community, subscribing to his brand of Islam.

50 Community interviewee: Turkish, female, London, 20s.
51 www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/jan/21/britishidentity5
52 Gülen is one of Turkey’s most prominent religious figures; a noted Islamic scholar with a global network of millions of followers, and seen as an inspirational leader who encourages a life guided by moderate Islamic principles. To his detractors in Turkey, he represents a threat to the countries secular order. He has kept a relatively low profile since settling in the United States in 1999, having fled Turkey after being accused of undermining secularism. ‘The World’s Top 20 Public Intellectuals’, *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2008. www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4349.
There is also a minority school of Islam, called Alevi, a form of Islam seen as more liberal and egalitarian than many Sunni versions. Alevites are found in both Kurdish and Turkish communities and one interviewee estimated that there are around 1,000-2,000 in England. There is a leading Alevi cultural centre and Cemevi, which is the community’s place of gathering and worship, in Hackney in east London.

There are also a small number of Ismailis and Jafaris among the Turkish speaking community in London. Whilst there is a history of tension between Alevis and Sunnis, this is disputed by some. For example, one Turkish respondent suggested that:

_The Turkish Muslims do not have such difference in terms of school of thought but the Alevis, Ismailis, Jafaris (denominations) have conflict amongst each other._

Despite this, it is important to note that all the respondents from the mosques, cultural centres and schools have emphasised that a range of people from various religious and ethnic denominations are welcomed into their institutions, and that there is no segregation amongst the community in such facilities. Mosques attended by the Turkish speaking community in London include:

- Valide Sultan Camii (Valide Sultan Mosque), Islington
- Fatih Camii (Faith Mosque), Wood Green
- Aziziye Mosque, Stoke Newington
- Süleymaniye Mosque, Hackney.

Additionally, the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, a governmental institution, also provides religious services to the Turkish community throughout Europe by appointing attachés for religious affairs and by sending imams to many cities including London.

Respondents noted that religious adherence differs significantly across the community. For example, Turkish Cypriots are believed by most respondents to not be visibly and publicly engaged in daily formal religious practice, and this is perceived as having continued on arrival in the UK, although religion comes to the fore at life events such as death in the family. Some respondents have suggested that there is a visible trend amongst younger Turkish Cypriots towards increasing religious practice, but that outward displays of religiosity are generally frowned upon by their families, who retain a strong wariness towards overt expressions of religion, particularly in the current climate of hostility towards Muslims.

53 Community interviewee: Turkish, London, male, 40s. Alevis are less likely to go to the mosque and do not pray five times a day. They fast for only seven days at Ramadan and in Turkey they often live in different villages from Sunni Muslims. Alevis will often not admit their identity in public due to a history of oppression. A respondent noted that there is some debate within the community about whether Alevi is a branch of Islam or should be seen as a cultural group.

54 Community interviewee: Turkish, London, male, 20s.
There are two commonly held perceptions of the patterns of religious development among the wider young Turkish speaking population in London. One perception is that there is indifference to matters of faith and religious identity, a view driven by an absence of a visible religious identity such as headscarves. However, some respondents believe that the lack of visible religiosity does not necessarily imply an indifference to faith but a hesitation to display outward signs of religion and possibly the influence of the politics of religious symbols in Turkey. A second perception sees an increasingly disillusioned young population with a real overt interest in religion, along with a desire to see ‘Islamic organisations develop into European organisations and not remain as extensions of mainland Turkish organisations.’

8.4 Language

Turkish is the main language spoken among the communities in the UK, but Kurdish and a Turkish Cypriot dialect are also spoken among those groups. One study based on languages spoken by London’s school children estimated that there were 73,900 Turkish speakers in the capital in 2000. In addition, there are many other dialects and accents in the Turkish language as a result of history and cross cultural relationships. Many Turkish Cypriots for example, particularly those of the older generation, can speak both Turkish and Greek due to the Turks and Greeks living side by side in Cyprus prior to the war in 1974. Amongst the Kurds, many of the Turkish speakers also speak Kirmang which is a fusion of both Kurdish and Turkish. Other Kurdish languages spoken are Sorani and Badine, mainly spoken by Kurds originating from Iraq who are also fluent in Arabic.

The first generation of UK born Turkish speaking Muslims and recent migrants often speak fluent Turkish only, which is acknowledged to be problematic for the community in terms of accessing public services. As one respondent noted:

*Most often, Turkish translators are needed for those who cannot speak adequate English and so it stops them from going to the health services.*

Women within the community in particular feel constrained by language limitations, acknowledging that lack of English language skills affects their integration into wider society, interaction with their children, and their ability to navigate public authority institutions and agencies. The lack of language classes offered by community organisations was seen as a key issue amongst the women that were interviewed, although many participants recognised that this required renewed efforts to develop community infrastructure.

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57 Community interviewee: Turkish, male, London, 40s.
Young people from a very young age commonly attend Turkish school at the weekend and after school to learn about Turkish culture including dances, food, history and the language. A new Turkish language, ‘Anglo-Turkish’, has been forming amongst the second and third generations, where English and Turkish is used interchangeably, in the same sentences and in grammatically imaginative ways.
9 Intra-community Dynamics

9.1 Intergenerational issues

Respondents in this study perceived that the interaction between generations has become increasingly weak and fractured, characterised by confrontations over lifestyle choices, Turkish values and identity. Many respondents commented about parents ‘losing their children’ to crime or drugs, which they perceive is because of the difficulty that young people have in navigating their cultural identities and poor educational achievement. Older respondents perceived that young people face both peer and parental pressure to conform to seemingly competing cultural identities and find it difficult to negotiate between the culture of their country of heritage and the wider culture they live in. This comment is typical of the views expressed by a number of respondents on the subject:

*The older Turkish parents are concerned that their children will become anglicised and abandon their Turkish culture, resulting in them going off track.*

However, it is possible that respondents were referring to those in the community who were most at risk rather than making a statement about inter-generational relations in the community as a whole. For example, a report by JRF in 2005 found that many young Turks and Kurds rely on family and kin links to help them through the transition from adolescence to adulthood.

There were many concerns expressed by older respondents in relation to the next generation of Turkish children. These focused on poor educational achievement, lack of employment opportunities and exclusion, lack of respect for Turkish culture and elders, drug abuse, youth violence and in particular a growing gang culture. One respondent suggested that language problems and lack of parental and teacher awareness are affecting educational achievement:

*Many parents do not have an idea of simple things like what school and classes their children go to and so do not know about exclusion procedures in schools. Teachers are classifying the Turkish pupils as having special educational needs even though they do not have such needs.*

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58 Community interviewee: Turkish Cypriot, male, London, 40s.
59 Enneli, Modood and Bradley, 2005.
60 Placement in lower grades based on assessments in the host language and wrongful assignment of ethnic minority pupils to special education have been identified as key factors of institutional discrimination in the education system and causal factors of educational inequality. Lakhbir Bhandal and Laurence Hopkins (2007), *Fighting Racism and Promoting Equal Rights in the Field of Education*, European Network Against Racism. www.cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/pdf/education_en.pdf
61 Community interviewee: Turkish, male, London, 40s.
Additionally, there was a suggestion by a number of respondents that some parents may not only be fearful of encouraging their children to achieve academically in case they ‘lose’ their children to the wider society, but are also keen for them to join the family business instead, with the incentive of earning more than they would in another profession.

9.2 Young people

JRF’s 2005 study on young Turks and Kurds looked at the position of young people within London’s Turkish-speaking community. The report highlighted many challenges which face these youths including: problems related to truancy and exclusion; few are in employment with employers outside their own ethnicity and many are ambivalent about adopting a British identity. Many of the young Turks and Kurds in the study also saw themselves as separate from the ‘broader Muslim community’.

Respondents in our study addressed some of these issues as well as many conflicting family and identity issues. It is important to note that respondents were often keen to highlight the issues and challenges facing the community, rather than talk about the successes of many youth from the community who are excelling in school, higher education, public life and business.

Respondents were keen to stress that many young people, particularly boys, are lacking role models and emotional support from their fathers, particularly if the father works very long hours in restaurants. In some instances, mothers may also work and children are left in the care of childminders. The pressures on families were thought by a few respondents to spill into domestic violence, (see section 9.3 for further discussion of this issue) with a very negative impact on young people. A few respondents suggested that violence within the home and the lack of parental support and guidance can lead many young males to seek support and recognition from their peers, often in gangs, which in turn can lead to them becoming part of a culture centred on drugs and crime. As one respondent explained:

*There are a few positive images within the education system for the children, which is why young Turks are failing in schools and turning to criminality. The fact the young are born here and go to their local schools and face peer pressure, there is a clash of cultures, one at home and another at school. Also, many of the youth are witness to domestic violence at home and as a result they turn to gangs.*

62 Enneli, Modood and Bradley, 2005.
63 Ibid.
64 Community interviewee: Turkish, male, London, 30s.
An additional concern expressed by respondents, was the rising levels of suicides that have been occurring among Turkish youth over the past few years. Turkish and Kurdish males are the ethnic groups most vulnerable to suicide in the UK and the present suicide rate for Turkish men is double the national average.\(^{65}\) Some pointed to the cause as being the increasing alienation that has emerged between parents and their children. There are relatively few facilities in the community to reach out to the younger generation, but Turkish supplementary schools organise camps, trips, and football leagues to get them engaging and interacting with other community members.

### 9.3 Women

Most respondents noted that women in the Turkish speaking community have traditionally played a nurturing role in the family as well as being active in work and in the community. One respondent said:

> They are the unseen warriors in society. They look after the kids, they take them to places like the library, they pick them up from school, they take care of the house and they work.\(^{66}\)

Many older Turkish-born women tended to be involved in their husband’s businesses and, often have limited formal education and English language skills. Other women with basic education have found their choices to be limited, and many also experienced discrimination in the labour market. A respondent commented that:

> Language is power, and if women are educated in Cyprus, they can only get clerical and secretarial work because of their accent.\(^{67}\)

This situation is perceived to be changing as more young women are being educated to higher levels and moving into professional jobs such as teaching.

Many of the women respondents felt that due to traditional cultural norms and practices, the responsibilities and burdens of looking after their families is carried by them alone, without any practical or emotional support from their husbands. As one focus group respondent explained:

> They are raising the kids on their own whilst their husbands are working late or gambling at the social cafes, and having affairs. The women are thinking about their children and husbands and where they are. The load is on the women. Many troubled women come to the mosque for help and the imams try to help and provide solutions.\(^{68}\)

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\(^{66}\) Community interviewee: Turkish Cypriot, female, London, 50s.

\(^{67}\) Community interviewee: Turkish Cypriot, female, London, 60s.

\(^{68}\) Community interviewee: Turkish, male, London, 30s.
Some respondents raised the issue of domestic violence and suggested that social taboos and the fear of breaking up families’ causes many women not to report problems to police and other authorities. It is worth highlighting that whilst domestic violence occurs in most communities, including in the majority community, speaking out about domestic violence is more difficult in some ethnic minority communities, where women may feel that they are ‘letting the community down’ by bringing the issue to the attention of the authorities. The exact scale of the problem within the Turkish speaking and other ethnic minority communities is unknown and requires further research.

The inability to communicate in English, was reported to be a problem for many women in the community. This compounds many of the issues that some women face including: domestic violence, intergenerational problems, and access to the labour market and public services. However, many women, particularly younger generation, are beginning to assert themselves. As a consequence respondents reported that there is an increase in the number of divorces taking place. In response to this, there are a growing number of facilities being established for Turkish speaking women by various community organisations such as the Turkish Cypriot Women’s project to help single mothers.

9.4 Integration and cohesion

Most respondents did not view the Turkish speaking community as ‘settled’ or sufficiently integrated yet in the UK because of: perceived inequalities before the law, a felt lack of services provided to them, and an invisibility in the ‘mainstream’ of British society. Respondents noted that few Turks occupy visible or high profile positions within local authorities, the police or in parliament.

Strong identity formation and identification with Turkish culture and country of origin also has an impact on cohesion and integration, particularly among the older generation as they strive to sustain their Turkish identity. This fear of losing its identity is believed to prevent the Turkish speaking community from stepping out of its familiar environment, developing adequate English language skills, and from becoming more integrated into mainstream society. A number of respondents felt that as interpreters are normally provided for those who cannot speak English in settings such as the NHS, some people may feel they have no need to learn the English language. Respondents generally tended to see the Turkish Cypriots as more integrated due to their longer migration history in the UK. One respondent illustrated this through the changing terms Turkish Cypriots have used to describe themselves over time:

The first generation see themselves as Turkish Cypriots who are ‘Londrali’ (from London), whereas the second generation view themselves as ‘Londrali Kibrisli’, meaning a London Cypriot. This shows that they have been ‘Anglicised’.69

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69 Community interviewee: Turkish Cypriot, female, London, 50s.
According to some respondents, many Turkish people are caught up in a dilemma concerning their identity, because on the one hand many see themselves as Europeans, but hostility from other Europeans makes them feel “stuck in the middle”. Respondents frequently mentioned the way in which they are negatively perceived both as Muslims, as well as being viewed as distinctively foreign and different because of their Turkish ethnicity. One respondent commented on how the community is very aware of the phrase “bloody foreigners”, and how that has become a standing joke amongst themselves. An experience shared by many in the community is expressed by one focus group respondent as follows:

Since 7/7 a lot of people have been shouting abuse at me on the street; I never experienced any negativity before. I receive awkward looks as if people are frightened of me. I really feel discriminated against now because of all the hype and anniversaries of 9/11 and 7/7.

Some respondents suggested that young people, especially if they are religious, are more aware of the injustices in the Muslim world. However, when questioned about the presence of extremism or radicalisation within the community, none of the respondents believed there to be any concerns. One reason given for this was the lack of lengthy subjugation to imperial rule during the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent Republic of Turkey, compared to many other nations with Muslim majorities, in addition to the strong tradition of secularism built by the Turkish Republican State.

The ‘Dialogue Society’, set up by second generation British Turks in the UK has been undertaking projects over the past nine years to cultivate community cohesion and better understanding. However, respondents felt that the integration debate and effort is very one sided, and that more needs to be done by mainstream society to foster cohesion and integration. As one respondent out it:

We have a common language and our culture is changing. There should also be some effort made by white communities in this integration process. We need to create a common culture and they should play a leading role.
10 Media

10.1 Perceptions of the UK media

For those who consume the British media, most view it as prejudiced and accuse it of portraying Turks and Turkey in a stereotyped and negative way informed by historical distortions. Journalists are said to have limited contact with the community and to be reinforcing such stereotypical views. The tabloids are viewed as particularly racist and right wing, whilst *The Independent*, *The Guardian* and *The Observer* are believed to provide more balanced views about the community.

During this study, a major issue that emerged was the way in which Muslims in general are being negatively portrayed by the media. Many respondents expressed concerns about this, seeing the media as biased and subjective. As one respondent stated:

*The UK media does not portray an objective view, especially the tabloids like the Sun and Metro. A third of the content is based on Muslims and Arabs, associated with negative connotations like terrorism. There is never a positive comment.*

Respondents suggested that such reporting makes all Muslim communities feel alienated and distant from the mainstream society. The media is not seen as enlightening people but as causing chaos and prejudice towards Muslims. Respondents were also critical of the tendency of the media to link all crime committed by young Muslims as being perpetrated for religious purposes rather than because of lack of opportunities and general disadvantage, as is common across all communities.

As a result of mistrust of the British media and its focus on mainstream British culture, many in the community turn to the Turkish media for news and entertainment. Some respondents were concerned about the negative impact such viewing habits may have on integration in the long terms, particularly as many young people also tend to watch Turkish TV at home.

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72 Turkish community Focus group respondent, male.
10.2 Media consumption

The Turkish-speaking community is probably one of the most well provided for in London, with half a dozen local community-based newspapers, together with Turkish television channels and countless digital radio channels. London Turkish Radio is a station which members of the Turkish community (particularly the older generations) regularly tune in to. It is the first and only fully licensed radio station broadcasting in Turkish for a full 24hr period outside Turkey and Northern Cyprus, with coverage extending over most of the London Boroughs where large numbers of Turkish speaking communities reside. Bizim FM is also very popular in the community.

Satellite TV is also very popular, with Turkish (mainland Turkey) channels such as ATV, Kanal D and Star viewed regularly for news updates and entertainment. There are two main Turkish Cypriot channels, BRT and Kibris Genc. They can be accessed in the UK and watched by members of the Turkish Cypriot community. However, the Turkish channels (broadcast from Turkey) are generally more popular due to quality and content. Turkish Cypriot channels are generally watched for updates on the political situation in Cyprus due to the potential implications it has for family members back home and the diaspora (particularly those living in the UK who have properties and businesses in the north of the island).

Turkish newspapers are readily available across London. Papers from mainland Turkey include Hurriyet, Zaman and Sabah, and there are also numerous London based Turkish papers such as Toplum Postasi and the Londra Gazete that are widely circulated and read. Others include Haber, Olay and Avrupa. Most of these papers can also be accessed online, though there is a generational gap in terms of access and usage of the internet and in the content of what is accessed. The unresolved political situation in Cyprus has resulted in substantial coverage of the issue on the net with websites dedicated to highlighting the plight of Turkish Cypriots, with a slant on human rights abuses of the past and existing embargoes. Sites such as that of the Association of Turkish Cypriots living abroad and the Turkish Cypriot Network are popular.
11 Links with country of origin

11.1 Travel

People travel to Turkey regularly to visit family and friends, often staying for extended periods of two to three months. Some however face travel difficulties if they do not have indefinite leave to remain in the UK. This is more of an issue for later migrants rather than those who came here in the 1970s. Focus group participants also suggested that Turkish people are unfairly targeted for searches at British airports, particularly if they have a Turkish passport. This was a source of much discontent.

11.2 Remittances, business and commerce

Remittances were said by respondents to be a common community practice. In addition, the majority of the first generation have invested, and are still investing, in both Turkey and Cyprus, particularly in properties which can be used not only for holiday homes, but for business reasons as well. As many are Turkish citizens, they can also enjoy the economic benefits of being paid a pension there.

Official remittances to Turkey from the UK were estimated to be £139 million in 2004; however the figure including informal remittances is likely to be significantly higher. While many developing countries rely on remittances for regional and national development, official remittances contribute to only 0.3 per cent of Turkey’s Gross Domestic Product, the lowest of all the countries in this study that data is available for. Global remittances to Turkey declined steeply between 2000 and 2002 but have been rising relatively modestly since 2003 – see Chart 3.

Chart 3: Global official remittances to Turkey (Source: World Bank)

74 World Bank (2008), Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008: econ.worldbank.org
11.3 Political links

The Turkish speaking community is very aware of political issues in Turkey and Cyprus, and political and religious figures from Turkey have links with individuals and groups here. Significant community influencers originally from Turkey include Fetullah Gülen and the Nur group, which has established institutions around the world and was frequently mentioned by respondents – see 12.4.

11.4 Return home

In common with many other migrant communities, early Turkish migrants were preoccupied with the idea of working in the UK for a few years, saving money and then permanently returning to their country of origin. However, this “myth of return” has disappeared for the majority, with the establishment and emergence of second and third generations and an unwillingness to leave their children and grandchildren behind. The older generation, if they are able to, will often split their time between the UK and Turkey or Cyprus. For the younger generation there is a strong contrast between life in the UK and life in their country of heritage and many face difficulties in adjusting to another cultural context when they visit Turkey. As one Turkish Cypriot respondent commented:

_The community are nationalist, very loving of Turkey or Cyprus. They go on regular holidays but I couldn’t go back permanently. The legal system isn’t like the one here, and you get ‘ripped off’ when you are in Cyprus. The older generation had the idea of returning to their country of origin but this has changed as they have established their own families here. The community has purchased a house in Turkey or Cyprus and wish to retire there but cannot as the cultures vary too much between the two societies._

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75 Community interviewee: Turkish Cypriot, male, London, 40s.
12 Civil Society

12.1 Brief overview

Cultural, religious and religious-political organisations play an important role in the construction and maintenance of Turkish identity in Britain. Organisations and associations of various kinds were established and used by the Turkish speaking community in Britain as a response to changing social and cultural conditions. The issues revolving around culture, language, religion, welfare and education of the young generation preoccupied parental and familial concerns, and Turkish organisations emerged in response to these concerns related to the expression of Turkish ethnicity and identity. It was noted by some respondents that there is a considerable amount of assistance from the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot governments for supplementary schools and teachers in the UK.

12.2 Types of organisations and services

Organisations fall into religious and non-religious categories. The majority of the Turkish religious centres tend to be used by mainland Turks. The Turkish Cypriots are quite secular and more ‘culturally’ religious, and if they do use the mosques it is largely for arranging funerals. Alevis use Cemevis rather than mosques. Though community centres are open to all the community, there is a tendency for Kurdish ethnic groups, who may also be of Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian origin to utilise centres which are labelled as ‘Kurdish’.

Within Cypriot organisations it is common to find that provision is open not only to Turkish speaking ethnic groups, but also for Greek and Asian groups, particularly when offering ESOL classes. Different ethnic groups also use Turkish based centres for non-Turkish based services, such as enquiring about legal issues, housing, and British citizenship.

Key civil society structures in place for the community include Turkish supplementary schools, women’s groups, advice centres, organisations specialising in job training, and informal groups which allow people to come together to discuss common problems and what is happening in the community. However, many respondents agreed that in general there are difficulties in reaching out to Turkish youth:

Many institutions do not reach the youth in a meaningful way as many community groups are involved in political issues in Turkey rather than civil relationships in Britain.76

76 Community interviewee: Turkish, male, London, 30s.
Mosques are seen as key community institutions funded by the community. The importance of the mosque is emphasised by Küçükcan:

*The establishment of mosques has always been a priority for the Turks as they are considered to be traditional centres of Islamic learning, religious socialisation and education, which contribute to the construction of Turkish-Islamic identity. Activities held in mosques are designed to reawaken Islamic identity among the group, and pass the traditional values onto the young generation.*

The Suleymaniye Mosque and those of Nur Cemat are seen as very influential internationally and nationally, and the Azizia mosque is influential within England.

Day-mer and Halkevi are the main civil community centres in place for the Kurdish Turks, which offer legal advice, immigration advice, citizenship, facilitate stop smoking projects, English language teaching and business advice. These centres receive some public funding. Some commentators have suggested that among Turkish groups, the Kurds are a more ‘politicised’ group, and that conscious strategies of ‘ethnicity building’ and the consolidation of a distinct refugee identity are being pursued by political interests amongst Kurds in distinction to the ‘economic migrants’ status of Turks.

A key institution that has emerged in the community is the Dialogue Society which is also represented internationally. The Dialogue society has been interested in developing education for children, and providing knowledge about Islam through religious circles for both men and women on a weekly basis. These circles and its other events are also intended to act as a place for social gathering and are organised in metropolitan areas around England, although the majority take place in London. The society and its schools tend to be funded by Turkish businessmen and the schools are supplemented by small fees paid by the parents. The Society has various schools teaching the national curriculum, not based around Turkish culture and open to all ethnic groups. However, some respondents felt that other ethnic groups have dropped away and Turks tend to dominate the schools.

### 12.3 Key organisations

Organisations within the Turkish speaking community are often divided between Kurdish, Turkish Cypriot and mainland Turkish organisations. However, these are not strict divisions and many of the organisations cater to the range of individuals in the Turkish speaking community. There are a number of religiously orientated organisations as well educational associations and women’s groups.

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79 [www.dialoguesociety.org](http://www.dialoguesociety.org)
**Turkish Cypriot Community Association (TCCA):** Since its inception in 1976, the Turkish Cypriot Community Association has served the Turkish Cypriot diaspora in the United Kingdom through its various projects. In 1983, TCCA gave the Turkish Cypriot community a voice through the first UK based Turkish-language newspaper *Toplum Postasi*, which means ‘Community Post’ in Turkish, and which generates revenue by advertising. During the late 1980s, the TCCA initiated an Information and Advice Project and following that with many other smaller one off projects such as a Toy Library and MP surgery. In the 1990s, the TCCA began the Homecare Project serving the needs of the most disadvantaged within the community. It generates money from contracts providing the homecare facilities from local authorities in Haringey, Islington and Hackney. In 2000, the TCCA acquired its current premises of 628 Green Lanes, increasing the number of its buildings and its community activities.

**Dialogue Society:** The official launch of the Dialogue Society in 1999 was the end result of charitable work within the community dating back to 1994. This work concentrated on educational attainment and social integration of young people and resulted in the initiation of a number of different projects and charities still ongoing today. The Dialogue Society was founded as a registered Charity by second-generation British Muslims of Turkish background. Its objective is to advance and promote inter-faith, inter-cultural and inter-communal dialogue and partnership at all levels and among all people of Britain. To this end, the Dialogue Society has been undertaking numerous projects over the past nine years to cultivate community cohesion and better understanding. Over the years, and on the basis of collective experience and expertise to date, the Dialogue Society sees itself as providing strategic leadership to regional Muslim organisations involved in charitable work surrounding dialogue and education activities in the United Kingdom. As a result of this, and on the strength of recent events, including the international academic conference organised in 2007 at the House of Lords, the Dialogue Society is currently concentrating its efforts on developing policies for effective and meaningful dialogue which involves academic research and critique.

**Suleymaniye Mosque:** The construction of Suleymaniye began in 1995 and the mosque was finally opened to the public in October 1999. The Ottoman style mosque has a total capacity of 3,000 people and claims to be the largest Islamic complex in Europe. It includes a conference and wedding hall, guest rooms, class rooms, and funeral service facilities as well as accommodation for staff. It is the main umbrella organisation for other mosques and branches which include:

- Valide Sultan (Hackney, London)
- Fatih Mosque (Haringey, London)
- Hamidiye Mosque (Leicester)
- Selimiye Camii (Manchester)
- Osmaniye Mosque (Stoke-on-Trent).
Azizia Mosque: The Azizia Mosque is one of the oldest Turkish mosques in London, although only dating back to the early 1980s. It attracts most of the Turkish community from the surrounding areas, along with a mix of Kurds and some from the Asian communities. It provides a range of services from Islamic marital registries to teaching Arabic and the Qur’an.

Halkevi – Kurdish & Turkish Community Centre: Halkevi has been established in London for 20 years and provides a comprehensive service for the Kurdish/Turkish refugee communities in London, catering for their welfare, social health and educational needs. People from all classes and different backgrounds, for example Alevis and Sunnis, attend the centre. The centre does not differentiate between ethnic groups and ahs white British and Africans using the centre for advice.

Day-mer: This organisation was set up in 1989 to work with and on behalf of Turkish and Kurdish people living and working in London with the aims of: helping them solve their problems and promote their cultural, economic, social and democratic rights; strengthening solidarity among themselves as well as local people and help their integration into society. Services offered include homecare, education, welfare advice and drop in facilities, business advice, drugs and alcohol advice, an open learning centre, youth, sports and women’s services.

Cyprian Care: Cyprian Care is a Commission For Social Care Inspection (CSCI) registered ‘culturally sensitive’ domiciliary care agency primarily providing personal care and associated domestic care to the Turkish, Kurdish and Greek speaking communities residing in the boroughs of Greater London. The bulk of its employees are Turkish Cypriot but are able to use the three languages of Turkish, Kurdish and Greek to respond to the needs of the various ethnic groups within the area.

Kurdish Community Centre in Bradford: Activities include community parties/gatherings and translating for community members. The centre does not have established premises, and operates from a member’s house.

Turkish Cypriot Women’s Project: TCWP is a charitable organisation that offers services to women, including advice, support and counselling. Any Turkish-speaking woman can become a member of TCWP and vote at Annual General Meetings. There is an annual membership fee of £7, but this fee is not a statutory requirement to become a member. The centre provides services to all women, particularly for those who do not speak English. They are from various backgrounds, and many are working class and/or single mothers. The TCWP received funds from the lottery, Children in Need and also the government. The centre has over 500 members and there are people on the waiting list to use the service.
Wisdom School: Wisdom Primary & Secondary School is a private independent school opened to offer high quality education for boys and girls aged between 5-16 years from all communities. Its vision is of pupils and teachers working together within a small community to develop academic potential to the full. The school is ethnically diverse with Turkish, mixed Turkish/English, and Kurdish pupils. Even though it is a private school, respondents thought many of the families are council tenants and see schools like this as a last resort and promoting a good education and environment.

Shakelwell Lane Mosque: is a Mosque run by the local Turkish Cypriot community. Services provided include funeral, and teaching Qur’an.

Turkish Women’s Philanthropic Association: aims to offer services to older members of the Turkish speaking community. It holds lunch/dinner parties, and fundraises for causes in the UK and in Northern Cyprus.

Turkish Community Union (Swindon): the Union does not have established premises and is based in the house of a member of the management committee. Services provided include translation, organising women’s gatherings, and activities for children.

12.4 Key influencers

The main community influences are seen by many respondents to be institutions and community organisations rather than individual figures. They range from Turkish supplementary schools and the mosques Azizia and Suleymaniye, which are both based in East London. As well as religious and educational institutions being prominent influencers within the community, community centres and associations are seen as significant, including the TCWP, TCCA, Halkevi and Day-mer. These organisations are known across the community for providing a range of facilities.

One of the main groups identified as being influential are the Nur Cemati which follows the teachings of the theologian Fethullah Gülen which draw on a school of thought based on the 19th and 20th Islamic figure Said Nursi.

Political influencers in the Turkish speaking community include political figures and parties in Cyprus such as the CTP, who want a unified Cyprus, and president Denktash of Northern Cyprus.
12.5 Civic engagement and participation

The general view expressed by respondents was that there is a lack of engagement between public authorities and the Turkish speaking community, despite the period of time the communities have been settled here. A common perception was that engagement only occurs during election periods in which political party representatives contact Turkish community organisations in order to gain their vote. As one respondent commented:

*Ken Livingston and Boris Johnson visited the centre when the elections were coming up but there needs to be more [regular] contact with the community.*

Such meetings between the London Mayor’s office and Turkish and Kurdish groups and associations are welcomed, but respondents that engagement and dialogue need to be strengthened, and that politicians need to have more regular contact with the community.

A few organisations were acknowledged to have established good relations with public authorities. For example, Suleymaniye, the Turkish Islamic Cultural Centre is seen as having a good relationship with the local authority and the police, particularly on issues relating to Turkish youth. The Kurdish community centre in Bradford also stated that its members have once a year meetings with the authorities in order to voice their needs. However the overriding view that emerged from respondents was that, despite some of the problems and barriers within the community, the general lack of engagement is largely due to authorities not seeing the Turkish communities as having any major problems or needing to be responded to in terms of public policy.

12.6 Community issues and capacity building needs

Major issues for the community that emerged from the study centred on women and youth issues. In terms of women’s issues the focus was on language skills, employment opportunities and domestic violence, and concerns about young people centred on the educational achievement and their emerging involvement with gang culture, drug abuse and crime. Better public service provision in the Turkish language was also seen as important for the community.

Most respondents felt that sufficient funding is not available for community based groups, many of which fundraise internally for various events such as sports and educational purposes. Public authority support for community organisations is seen as sporadic and small, and organisations that provide a range of services and are well regarded in the community are overwhelmed by the demands they face.

Outside of London community organisations lack premises from which to operate, and often members use their own homes to serve the community. Others may rent a room once a week in another community centre. In this context there is little scope to build effective services that can serve young people, women and different communities.

*Community interviewee: Turkish, Male, London, 40s.*
13 Conclusions and recommendations

A key feature of the Turkish speaking community is its heterogeneous nature, with the three main groupings of mainland Turkish, Kurdish and Turkish Cypriot communities. Their migration and development histories are quite distinct, as are their languages, cultural and socio economic experiences in the UK. The Kurds, who came at a much later date and largely as refugees, are seen as the most ‘politicised’ of the three groups.

The Turkish speaking community also needs to be seen in the context of the recent history within its country of heritage of a secular/nationalist ideology strongly opposed to the ‘Islamisation’ of society. Whilst predominantly identified as Muslim, perceptions of the patterns of development in the communities differ widely, though the strength of these currents is not clear. Some see an indifference to matters of faith and religious identity, at least in public life, whilst others observe that mosques are key community institutions, with a number being of international repute. Many religious organisations are thought to be failing to reach out to young people who are keen to see Islamic organisations become more ‘European’ and not remain an ‘extension’ of mainland Turkish institutions.

Notwithstanding a strong sense of Turkish identity, the community has seen the emergence of an ‘Anglo-Turkish’ identity and language among the young. Whilst many young people easily negotiate their emerging and hybrid identities, others are finding the experience confusing and alienation, and the effects of this are thought to be evident in educational underachievement, crime, drug abuse a rising gang culture, and rising suicide rates. The position of women in contrast is seen to be improving, with more women accessing education and employment, as well as becoming more actively engaged in civil society organisations and networks outside the home.

Although the community as a whole has had a long established presence in Britain, it has remained largely invisible in public policy terms. In part this relates to a strong degree of self reliance and pride in Turkish identity, coupled with a widespread perception of the community as largely self-contained with no major concerns that merit significant public authority involvement and engagement. The research indicates that such perceptions are ill-founded and that the community has been facing serious development issues throughout the time it has been in the UK.

This is reflected in the voicing of various community concerns, particularly those relating to women’s and young people’s needs. These needs are also reflected in the level of demand experienced by the small number of community organisations offering services to the full range of Turkish speaking communities in their local areas and beyond. Civil society organisations by and large lack funding from public authorities and survive mostly on private fundraising from within the communities they serve.
13.1 Recommendations

This research has provided many insights into the Turkish speaking community in England, particularly Turkish Cypriots and Turkish in London. Subsequently, many areas were highlighted as community concerns but require further enquiry to draw firm conclusions. The UMEC reports should be seen as a starting point in the process of understanding England’s diverse Muslim and ethnic minority communities in greater detail.

The UMEC Overview report provides detailed recommendations for engagement with and development of Muslim civil society organisations. The following specific recommendations for public authorities are in relation to responding to the Turkish speaking community:

Specific recommendations arising from community respondents include:

- The need for funding support and cross-community capacity building, both for specific Turkish groups, such as women organisations, and for the wider community as a whole
- Key service needs include expanded English language provision, provision and support for women and young people, and the need to address significant educational, health (specifically substance abuse), employment and domestic violence issues that exist within the community
- Support and facilitation of activities and approaches that help address the intergenerational conflicts and divides that are contributing to the challenges and problems facing young people.

Other recommendations:

- The Turkish speaking community in the UK has a rich and relatively long history. It is important that there is better documentation of their history and contribution to British society. We would recommend that a project similar to the ‘Moroccan Memories’ project is supported to provide a strong historical footprint of the Turkish speaking community in London and the UK. With support from the Heritage Lottery Fund, Moroccan Memories in Britain is a national project run by the Migrant and Refugee Communities Forum. The project aims to bridge a historical gap between past and post 1960 Moroccan migration to Britain by creating an oral and visual history archive collection. www.moroccanmemories.org.uk/
- There is also a notable absence of specific research on the Kurdish community in the UK. The scope of this study did not provide us with enough data to provide a separate overview of the challenges facing Kurdish populations in the UK, and therefore a better understanding for policy makers and practitioners
- Given the number of times respondents mentioned the issue of domestic violence, and suicide amongst young people, we recommend further research in these areas to determine their extent, as well as to assist in the development of culturally appropriate strategies to address these issues.

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14 Glossary

**AKP**: Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*).

**Alevi/Alevism**: In *Alevism*, men and women are regarded as equals, and pray side by side. Some consider Alevism a type of Shi’a Islam (and specifically, of Twelvers), since Alevis accept some Shi’a beliefs, however they are uncomfortable describing themselves as Shi’a, since there are major differences in philosophy, customs, and rituals from the prevailing form of Shi’ism in modern Iran. In addition to its religious aspect, Alevism is also closely associated with Anatolian folk culture. The Kurdish and Turkish languages (not Arabic) are generally used in Alevi rituals. During the 1960s, many younger Alevis came to conceive of Alevism in non-religious terms, with some even relating it to Marxism. The 1990s brought a new emphasis on Alevism as an ethnic or cultural identity. Alevi communities in Turkey today generally support secularism, after the Kemalist model, partly out of mistrust of majoritarian religiosity. (Esposito, 2008).

**Circassians**: Ethnic group from the caucuses with a large population in Anatolian Turkey. Divisions include the Laz.

**CLG**: Communities and Local Government.

**CTP**: Republican Turkish Party.

**EEC**: European Economic Community.

**Hanafi School**: Major Sunni Islamic school of law which emphasises analogous reasoning of jurists over literal interpretation of *hadith*. Predominate in the Arab world and South Asia. It is the oldest of the four schools of thought (jurisprudence or Fiqh) within Sunni Islam. Named after its founder, Abu Hanifa an Nu’man ibn Th bit (699 – 767), the Hanafi school is the oldest, but it is generally regarded as the most liberal and as the one which puts the most emphasis on human reason. The Hanafi school also has the most followers among the four major Sunnis and is predominant among the Sunnis of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the most of the Indian Subcontinent, China as well as in Iraq, Turkey, Albania, the Balkans and the Caucasus. (Esposito, 2008).

**IPPR**: Institute for Public Policy Research.

**Ismaili**: A Shi’a sect which emerged in 765 over a disagreement over the successor to the Sixth Imam. In common with other Shi’as, the Ismailis affirm that after the Prophet’s death, Ali, the Prophet Mohammad’s cousin and son-in-law, became the first Imam (spiritual leader) of the Muslim community and that this spiritual leadership (known as Imamate) continues thereafter by hereditary succession through Ali and his wife Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter. The point of difference with ‘Twelver’ Shi’as is the acceptance of Ismaili ibn Ja’far as a divinely appointed successor, and seventh Imam, rather than Musa al-Kazim.
**Jafaris/Twelvers:** Twelver is a branch of Shi’a Islam that refers to Muslims who adhere to the twelve succeeding imams ending with the Prophet Muhammad al-Mahdi in the 10th Century. The majority of Shi’as are twelvers. Also known as Ja’fari or Ithna Ashari. (Esposito, 2008).

**JRF:** Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

**KGK:** People’s Congress of Kurdistan or Kongra-Gel.

**Laïcité:** Laïcité is broadly a separation of religion from public affairs but can take many forms – for example, in Turkey religious education is permitted but only under the strict control of the state whereas in France privately supported religious education is allowed. Under the Turkish constitution no political party can claim to represent a form of religious belief.

**NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

**NSC:** National Security Council.

**OECD:** Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.

**PKK:** Kurdistan Workers Party.

**Shafi School:** School of Islamic law founded by Muhammad ibn Idris ibn al-Abbas ibn Uthman ibn Shafii in the eighth century. Prominent in Egypt, Palestine, and Jordan with a significant number of followers in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Hejaz, Pakistan, India, and Indonesia and among Sunnis in Iran and Yemen. The Shafi school also refers to the opinions of Muhammad’s companions (primarily Al-Khulafa ar-Rashidun). The school, based on Shafi’s books ar-Risala fi Usul al-Fiqh and Kit b al-Umm, emphasises proper istinbaat (derivation of laws) through the rigorous application of legal principles as opposed to speculation or conjecture. It is considered one of the more conservative of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence. (Esposito, 2008).

**Sunni:** Muslims who emphasise the importance of the actions and customs of Muhammad and the first generations of Muslims, viewing as legitimate the establishment of the caliphate, in contrast to Shi’a beliefs. About 85 per cent of all Muslims are Sunnis. (Esposito, 2008).

**Zazas:** Ethnic group in Eastern Anatolia.
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This report presents a picture of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot Muslim community in England. It is one of a series of thirteen reports on different Muslim communities in England.

It has been commissioned by the Department for Communities and Local Government to enhance the understanding of the diversity of England’s Muslim population and as an effective route to engagement.